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Introduction: Coping with Complexity

Last December, the eyes of all those with a
stake in international affairs turned to Europe.
First they looked to Geneva, for signs that the
long-running Doha Round of multilateral trade
negotiations at the World Trade Organization
(WTO) would get back on track after years of
stalemate. Then observers turned to Copenhagen,
hoping to see a binding and comprehensive
agreement reflecting a commitment on the part of
the world’s governments to address the pressing
global challenge of climate change. They were to
be sorely disappointed. Inscribed on the faces of
those struggling to reach agreements was a deep
frustration with multilateral processes that were
proving incapable of delivery. Instead of agreement,
the images playing out on television screens and in
newspapers around the world were of fractiousness
and division, due in part to the large number of
participants and contentiousness of the issues
faced; of anger, on the part of all those who felt
marginalized by the process; and of concern, from
those looking for signs that the world still has the
capacity to reach accords when it really matters.

failure to reach agreements can best be seen as part
of a long-term trend toward increased complexity
in the world that makes it nearly impossible to
reach traditional multilateral binding accords,
combined with a waning of faith on the part of
many countries in multilateralism and multilateral
institutions.

The failure of these meetings to produce formal
agreements—or even specific paths to reaching
agreements in the future—despite the high stakes
and the political capital that had been invested in
advance left many questioning the ability of the
world’s leaders to meet global challenges, shedding
a spotlight on the institutions and fora that were
established for the purpose of achieving multilateral
solutions to the most pressing collective problems
of the 21st century.

This increased complexity stems from a number
of seismic shifts in international relations—and
especially in international economic relations—
some of which have been unfolding over the
course of decades while others are of more recent
origin. Government policies and international
arrangements for collective decision-making
have not kept pace with changes in the world,
especially the high degree of international
economic integration and interdependence. With
decolonization came increases in the number of
countries who are players on the world stage as
well as a rebalancing of global economic power that
has continued with the rise of the BRICs (Brazil,
Russia, India, and China) and the other emerging
market economies. The collapse of the Soviet
bloc, accompanied by market reforms in China
and India in the 1980s and 1990s accelerated the
rapid integration of the global economy. Where
previously only about half the world’s population—
the Oraganisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) countries, plus parts of
Latin America and Asia—were engaged in global
economic activity, suddenly people everywhere
were brought together in a single world economy
based on capitalism and markets.

Why did these meetings fail? Many had assumed
that the most significant economic crisis since the
Great Depression and the overwhelming scientific
and circumstantial evidence of damaging changes
to our climate would compel world leaders to
set aside their differences and reach meaningful
agreements. But it did not happen. It is not that the
problems are not big enough or urgent enough. The

At the macro-level, this led to shifting trade
flows and patterns of foreign direct investment,
a rise in the number and size of multinational
companies and financial institutions, and surging
global demand. It also meant a corresponding
increase in the speed with which goods,
money, and technology traverse the globe. At
the micro-level, the “great doubling” of the
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The long-term
trend toward
increasing
complexity
combined with a
waning faith in
multilateralism
and multilateral
institutions
makes it nearly
impossible to
reach traditional
binding
multilateral
accords.

global workforce has had a direct effect on
wages, income levels, and employment in the
advanced industrial countries, in some instances
prompting fears of economic insecurity and
a public backlash against “globalization.”1

The inability
to create new
institutions or
reach agreements
means greater
reliance on—and
greater need
for renovation
of—the existing
international
economic
institutions, the
IMF, the World
Bank, and the
WTO.

Taken together, all these factors have stretched the
capacity of the current institutions of multilateral
governance to a breaking point, leading to
fragmentation and the emergence of deep divisions
among groups of countries at different stages of
economic development. Throw in the increases
in the complexity of the issues themselves and the
degree to which these issues overlap and affect one
another and the problems of the 21st century begin
to look too complex to handle.
This paper argues that learning to operate in this
vastly more complex world will require more
multilateralism, not less. It means greater reliance
than ever on those economic institutions and
fora that have already learned to function in a
global fashion—particularly the World Bank,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the
WTO. It contends that creating new international
institutions or binding accords is nearly impossible
in today’s world, and examines where the existing
institutions stand today and the changes that will be
necessary if they are to form the core of an effective
global economic architecture for the 21st century.
Secondly, the paper explores the problems created
by the lack of faith in multilateralism, particularly
on the part of many developing and emerging
market countries, who either don’t want to rely on
the multilateral institutions designed in a bygone
era when the transatlantic powers dominated the
world or who find that their economic needs can be
more easily addressed through bilateral or regional
agreements rather than working through the often
1
Richard B. Freeman, America Works: Critical Thoughts on the
Exceptional U.S. Labor Market (Russell Sage Foundation, 2007).
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more cumbersome processes at the multilateral
level. Despite a new multilateralist president in
the United States, the momentum in the world of
global governance today is in the wrong direction,
to be found in the hundreds of regional, subregional, and bilateral agreements that have come
into force in the last several decades. With each
such agreement comes a lessening of the energy,
time, and resources left for multilateralism and
multilateral institutions—along with the hard fact
that the toughest global problems thus remain on
the table, unsolved and insoluble through such
regional arrangements.
Third, the paper contends that, in the absence of
any prospect of building a new global economic
architecture, the existing institutions of multilateral
economic governance must be “renovated.” Their
governance structures need to be changed to reflect
the dramatic shifts in the distribution of economic
weight among countries, their mandates revised
in order to ensure that they cover a wider range of
issues but with better coherence among them, and
they must be adapted in the face of proliferating
regionalism, with a shift toward accommodating
and incorporating regional accords within
multilateral frameworks.
This paper also contends that while these changes
are both daunting and essential if the institutions
are to have the efficiency, effectiveness, and
legitimacy they require, they are in fact well within
the grasp of the current world system. We are
not, in other words, in “a 1944 moment”—the
constitution-making epoch when the United
Nations, along with the World Bank, the IMF, and
the predecessors to the WTO were created largely
out of whole cloth. Nor do we need to be in such
a moment in order to achieve a global economic
architecture capable of meeting the needs of
the 21st century. The current crisis, the coming
together of world leaders through the elevation
of the G20, and a common understanding of the

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

failings of the current international economic
institutions ought to be enough to compel these
much-needed renovations of the system.
Finally, although leadership will be needed
from countries all around the world, the paper
concludes by suggesting the role that Europe
and the United States must play if they are to

help save what together they started 65 years
ago—the institutions of a multilateral economic
order created to bring about global peace and
prosperity for all, with a commitment to think
and act globally when addressing the most
pressing economic problems of the day.
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Solid Foundations: The Architecture of
Global Economic Governance

In 1944, in the woods of New Hampshire, with
the end of World War II already in sight, an
extraordinary set of gatherings occurred, bringing
together an array of government officials whose
vision for a better future was shaped by the hard
lessons of the 1930s. Rejecting the catastrophic
“beggar-thy-neighbor” policies of the major
economic powers that had hastened the slide
into worldwide depression and war, these public
servants dedicated themselves instead to the
creation of a rules-based international economic
order that would serve as the basis for peace and
prosperity. Over the course of the Bretton Woods
Conference, the subsequent Dumbarton Oaks
and San Francisco meetings, and the months
that followed, they conceived of and created the
charters for four major international institutions—
the United Nations (UN), the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (World
Bank), the International Monetary Fund, and the
International Trade Organization (ITO).2
At their inception, each of the major international
institutions played specified roles. The UN bore
responsibility for issues of diplomacy, security, and
war; the World Bank for international development
and the reduction of poverty; the International
Monetary Fund for financial stability and economic
cooperation; and the GATT, precursor to the World
Trade Organization, for trade liberalization and
institutional stability in the world trading system.
These institutions, while far from perfect, have
done much to accomplish their most fundamental
goals. In light of the tremendous pressure from
around the world to protect domestic markets

and jobs, the GATT/WTO and its rules and
disciplines have kept an outbreak of Depressionera protectionism at bay for half a century, and
eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations
have resulted in widespread liberalization of
trade—at least in industrial products among
industrial countries. The UN, while not achieving
the ultimate goal of bringing an end to all wars,
has done much to contain crises, settle regional
conflicts, man peacekeeping missions, eradicate
diseases, and work out agreements on everything
from human rights conventions to the use of the
seabed and of outer space. Similarly, the World
Bank, while not eliminating poverty, has seen
the portion of the world’s population living in
poverty decline from 40 percent 20 years ago to
21 percent today, along with providing loans and
development assistance in more than 126 countries
and participating in initiatives on everything
from combating HIV/AIDS to biodiversity to
education and debt relief for the poorest countries.
The Bank is rightfully commended for its ability
to raise and channel resources for development,
for its highly-trained staff, and for its depth of
knowledge about development strategies and
approaches across country boundaries.3 The
IMF, while it has evolved considerably from its
initial days of monitoring adherence to the par
value system of fixed exchange rates, has made
important changes to its key instruments—
surveillance, lending, and technical assistance—
allowing it to contain a number of financial crises,
continue concessional lending where necessary,
and join the fight against extreme poverty.4
“Repowering the World Bank for the 21st Century.” Report of
the High-Level Commission on Modernization of World Bank
Group Governance (the “Zedillo Commission Report”), Oct.
2009, p. 9.

3

The UN, IBRD (World Bank) and IMF all came into being
with little delay. However, attempts to launch the ITO with a
broad mandate had to be abandoned in 1951 when the Truman
Administration announced that it would not seek ratification of
the Havana Charter due to lack of support in the U.S. Congress.
Instead, in 1947 a smaller group of countries negotiated the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was
transformed in 1995 into the World Trade Organization (WTO).
2
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4
Rodrigo de Rato, former managing director of the IMF took
the view before the 2008-2009 financial crisis that fundamental
reform to the IMF was not needed, arguing that the IMF
had evolved over its 60 years through amendments to its key
instruments while remaining true to its purposes of fostering
international economic cooperation, promoting rising prosperity
and safeguarding global financial stability. Rodrigo de Rato, “Is
the IMF’s Mandate Still Relevant?” Global Agenda, Jan. 2005.
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For their part, the United States and the member
states of the European Union have been among
the most active and engaged participants in
these institutions. This is unsurprising, given
the role the transatlantic partners played in
creating these institutions and the interests they
were originally intended to serve. At bottom,
the postwar global economic architecture was
established as a means to tie the West together

in the emerging Cold War context through the
liberalization of international trade and capital
flows. First through the institutions of the Bretton
Woods system, and then through the Marshall
Plan, the United States was able to rebuild the
shattered production capacity and financial
markets of Western Europe. For the United States,
the overriding purpose was clear: the politicalstrategic need to build up a bulwark against

Table 1. The architecture of global economic governance
International Monetary Fund
(IMF)

World Bank

World Trade Organization (WTO)

Began with: 44 members

Began with: 44 members

Began with: 23 GATT parties

Now: 186 Members

Now: 186 Members

Now: 153 Members

Mandate:

Mandate:

Mandate:

•

Promotes international
monetary cooperation

•

•

Macroeconomic surveillance

•

Promotes exchange stability

•

Develops multilateral
system of payments

•

Makes resources available
to member’s experiencing
balance of payments
difficulties.

•

•

•
Evolved from facilitator of
post-war reconstruction and
•
development to mandate of
worldwide poverty alleviation

Forum for trade negotiations

Promotes long-term
economic development
by providing technical and
financial support

•

Monitors and implements
trade agreements

•

Technical assistance and
training for developing
countries

•

Cooperation with other
international organizations

Funds loans through
member country
contributions and bond
issuance

Handles trade disputes
through dispute settlement
process

Revenue: $325 billion in quotas
contributed by members (as of
3/09)

Revenue: In 2009, IBRD raised
$44.3 billion. In FY 09–11,
commitments of $41.7 billion
made available to IDA

Revenue: Administrative
budget of $173 million, paid
by contributions from members
based on a share of world trade

Loans or grants: $175.5 billion
in loans committed, of which
$124.5 billion not drawn (as of
9/09)

Loans or grants: $58.8 billion
in total commitments (loans,
credits, guarantees, and grants)
in 2009

Loans or grants: $28 million
of training and technical
assistance provided; support for
Aid for Trade initiatives

Source: IMF, World Bank, WTO websites
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history is that
the United States
and Europe enjoy
outsized control at
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Communism. But it also served U.S. economic
self-interest: a significant portion of Marshall Plan
aid effectively went to boost European demand
for goods from the United States, helping stave
off domestic fears of a postwar slump or renewal
of the Great Depression. Over the medium term,
the Bretton Woods system helped create foreign
markets for the United States by conjuring up a
middle class in U.S. economic partners around the
world, something from which the Europeans—
once they were back on their feet following the
Marshall Plan and the reconstruction program
of the Organization for European Economic
Cooperation—have also been able to benefit.
Today, by way of illustration, nearly one-third of
U.S. and EU exports are to developing countries
where the World Bank has lending programs.

has proceeded apace, propelled by freedom of
capital movements, the development of new and
expanding markets, economies of scale, cheaper
sources of supply of raw materials and finished
goods, the international migration of labor, and
technological advances in production processes,
transportation, and communications.

By together establishing the rules and standards of
conduct by which the global economy is governed,
the United States and European Union became
the stewards of the international economic order,
running the system for much of the postwar
era. In return, the three pillars of the global
economic architecture they established—covering
the financial side of economies (IMF), trade in
goods and the real side of economies (GATT/
WTO), and international development and
poverty alleviation (World Bank)—have delivered
enormous economic benefits to their founders.
Despite occasional challenges, the system has
fared well. It has provided stability and market
opening, relatively stable foreign exchange rates,
the ready availability of capital, and a forum for the
coordination of macroeconomic policies. Between
the first GATT round in 1947 and the launch of the
Doha Round at the WTO in 2001, international
trade increased enormously, by more than 100 fold.
Global financial flows have grown by a still greater
amount. The integration of the world economy

Both the World Bank and the IMF have a board of
24 executive directors, with most of the executive
directors speaking for (and voting for) a group
of countries. Five countries, however, have their
own appointed seats: the United States, Germany,
France, the United Kingdom, and Japan. In
addition to the German, French, and British seats,
the 24 other members of the European Union are
part of the group of countries represented by seven
other executive directors, thereby giving Europe
three exclusive seats and a significant presence in
seven others. As such, the EU’s member states can
influence 32 percent of the votes at the IMF—and
a similar (although not exactly equal) number at
the World Bank. At the WTO, the United States
and Europe have traditionally made up two of
the so-called “quad” countries (the United States,
European Union, Canada, and Japan) that for a
long time were viewed as the “dealmakers” for any
trade agreement, to which the rest of world was
expected to simply sign on.

8

The legacy of this history is that the United
States and Europe enjoy outsized control at the
Bretton Woods institutions. Both benefit from the
unwritten rule that the president of the World Bank
is always an American, while the managing director
of the IMF is always a European. Seven of the top
ten countries that are “overrepresented” at the IMF
(in terms of the difference between their IMF quota
share and their share of world GDP) are European.

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Figure 1. Under- and over-representation at the International Monetary Fund

Under-represented Countries
-6.00 -5.00 -4.00 -3.00 -2.00 -1.00

EU Member States
Non-EU States
Difference between IMF
Quota Share and Share
of World GDP (%)

Over-represented Countries
0.00

0.00

1.00

2.00

Saudi Arabia
China
Germany
United States
Belgium
India
France
Brazil
Netherlands
Mexico
United Kingdom
Turkey
Switzerland
Russia
Canada
Iran
Venezuela
Korea
Sweden
Spain
Denmark
Indonesia
Italy
United Arab Emirates
Norway
Poland
Austria
New Zealand
Kuwait
Japan
Libya
Thailand
Iraq
Romania
Nigeria
Slovak Republic
Singapore
Bangladesh
Finland
Morocco
Ireland
Kazakhstan
Malaysia
Greece
Chile
Nicaragua
Zambia
Czech Republic
Algeria
Colombia

Notes: 25 IMF members with the smallest and largest differences between IMF quota share and share of world GDP. GDP is adjusted
for purchasing power parity (PPP).
Source: Rebecca Nelson, “The G20 and International Economic Cooperation: Background and Implications for Congress,”
Congressional Research Service, Dec. 9, 2009.
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The Great Recession and the Steering
Committee of the World Economy

With the bursting of the housing bubble in the
United States in 2007 and the train of events that
led to the destabilization of the global financial
system, the world economy collapsed into a
steep recession in the final quarter of 2008, with
global real GDP dropping at a 6 percent annual
rate. This is undoubtedly the sharpest decline in
world output—and especially in world industrial
production and world trade—of the postwar era.
Worldwide exports plummeted from $16.1 trillion
in 2008 to $11.2 trillion in 2009, a drop of over 30
percent. Virtually all countries were sucked into
the downturn, with the world witnessing the first
significant decline in world real GDP (of nearly one
percent) in six decades.
The full story of why this collapse occurred is
still being written, but it starts with a focus on
developments in the United States—especially the
expansion and subsequent collapse of the real estate
and real estate financing bubble and its impact on
an overleveraged U.S. and global financial system.
Add to the tale the accounts of persistently easy
monetary policies, very low interest rates and
interest rate spreads, and a general disregard of
growing risks in the financial system, and the key
causes begin to come into focus. Others would
point to huge current account savings and reserve
accumulations in Asia, particularly China, and
the mirror-image deficits in the United States as
another major underlying cause of the troubles.
This Great Recession of 2008–2009 has tested the
international economic institutions as never before.
In response, the IMF has stepped up its role as a
lender of last resort, providing financial support
packages to (among others) Iceland, Ukraine,
Hungary, Pakistan, Belarus, Serbia, Armenia, El
Salvador, and Latvia, and has also extended credit
to Mexico, Poland, and Colombia under a new
flexible credit line. In order to better equip the
Fund for this task, G20 leaders at their London
summit in April 2009 pledged to triple the IMF’s

10

lending capacity to $750 billion. Additionally,
they urged the Fund to intensify its economic
surveillance and early warning systems.
The World Bank has also moved to expand
and speed up lending, assistance, and advice to
developing countries, committing a record high of
nearly $60 billion to countries hit by the financial
crisis in fiscal year 2009—an increase of 54 percent
over the previous year. An additional $8.3 billion
was mobilized as part of the World Bank’s global
crisis response initiative to lessen the impact of
the crisis on the most vulnerable, especially in
low-income countries. These initiatives focus
on safety net programs to protect the most
vulnerable, maintaining long-term infrastructure
investment programs, and on sustaining the
potential for private sector-led economic growth
and employment creation, particularly through the
support of small and medium-size enterprises.
The WTO for its part began a new monitoring
and reporting mechanism on protectionist actions
taken by WTO members and worked to ensure
that markets remained open and that countries
adhered to their WTO commitments. The WTO
also pushed G20 members to keep their pledges of
support for Aid for Trade initiatives and worked to
ensure that trade finance remained available and
affordable.
The second major systemic response to the Great
Recession has been the transformation of the
little-known G20 gatherings of finance ministers
and central bankers into an affair involving
heads of state, declared by these leaders to be
“the premier forum for international economic
cooperation.”5 The G20 started in 1999 in the
wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis as a forum
that brought together finance ministers from
5
The Pittsburg Summit: Leaders’ Statement, paragraph 19.
“We designated the G20 to be the premier forum for our
international economic cooperation.”
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major advanced and emerging economies with
the goal of stabilizing global financial markets.
With its ascendancy as part of the response to the
Great Recession, it has now supplanted the G7/
G8 meetings as the “chief steering committee of
the world economy.”6 The inclusion in the G20
of a number of countries beyond the historical
G7/G8 grouping no doubt stemmed, at least in
part, from a recognition of the growing power of
the emerging market and developing countries,
who now account for more than 40 percent
of the world economy. To have any sense of
legitimacy throughout the world and particularly
among the emerging market economies,
expansion of the leadership circle was critical.
However, the initial G20 Leaders Summit, held in
Washington in November 2008, was something of
an EU-U.S. joint venture. British Prime Minister
Gordon Brown had been calling for a “Bretton
Woods II” to completely revise global economic
governance, and the United States responded by
promoting the idea of a G20 gathering, elevated
to the level of heads of state, and extended the
invitation for an initial meeting in Washington.
European leaders at first exhibited differences of
viewpoint on this approach, with French President
Nicolas Sarkozy needing to be convinced of the
appropriateness of the G20 as a venue, given that
EU member states hold four of the seven seats (57
percent) at the G7 but only those same four seats
plus one for the European Union (25 percent)
at the G20. But in the end there was acceptance
of the G20 as the only available forum with the
scope of membership required to develop ideas,
reach consensus on their desirability, and work to
implement them.

6
C. Fred Bergsten, Peterson Institute for International
Economics, “A Blueprint for Global Leadership in the TwentyFirst Century,” Keynote Speech at the Global Human Resources
Forum, Seoul, Korea, Nov. 4, 2009.

The evolution of the G20 also caused an evolution
in the European approach to such summits. Efforts
were made prior to and after each meeting to come
to a Europe-wide position, with the European
Council adopting a number of principles for action
where agreements could be reached—principally
in the area of enhancing sound regulation and
reforming the international financial institutions.
The European Commission was given the task of
developing proposals for comprehensive reform
of the financial system, which were then endorsed
by the European Council and urged upon the rest
of the G20 leaders by European heads of state.
Throughout these efforts, Europe needed to find
common ground among competing positions, with
the United Kingdom arguing for more stimulus
from other governments, Germany emphasizing
the need to avoid major budget deficits, and France
pushing for a major clampdown on executive
compensation and a general tightening of financial
regulation. The United States joined the United
Kingdom and Japan in pushing for more stimulus
from others while initially resisting any shift of
financial regulatory policy out of the hands of
national regulators.
What emerged from these G20 summits is fairly
remarkable—both in terms of the substance of
the consensus that was reached and in terms of
the process. Despite starkly differing views on
how to stimulate economic growth and recovery,
agreement was reached to pump more than $1
trillion into the global economy—albeit through
the IMF, rather than individual countries—in the
form of $500 billion in new lending capacity, $250
billion in new Special Drawing Rights, and $250
billion in trade finance. Separately, the G20 asserted
that commitments by individual countries for fiscal
expansion would total $5 trillion over two years.
Demands from some European countries for a
major toughening of the regulation and oversight of
financial institutions were met through the creation
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The inclusion
in the G20 of
a number of
countries beyond
the historical
G7/G8 grouping
partly stems from
a recognition
of the growing
power of the
emerging market
and developing
countries, who
now account for
more than 40
percent of the
world economy.

Table 2. Numbers count: From the G7/G8 to the G20
G7/G8

G7 Members

Legend
G7 member countries
Not members of G7

Country

GDP (millions
of dollars)*

Canada

1,499,551

2.46%

France

2,866,951

4.71%

Germany

3,673,105

6.03%

Italy

2,313,893

3.80%

Japan

4,910,692

8.06%

United
Kingdom

2,680,000

4.40%

United States

14,441,425

23.71%

G7

32,385,617

53.16%

1,676,586

2.75%

G8

34,062,203

55.92%

EU countries
in G8

11,533,949

18.93%

Russia
Source: G20 website; www.g20.org
EU G8: France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom.

G20/G20 + non G8 EU

G20 Members
Country

G20 member countries
EU countries not
individually represented
in G20
Not members of G7
Source: G20 website; www.g20.org

GDP (millions
of dollars)*

% of world
GDP

Argentina

324,767

0.53%

Australia

1,013,461

1.66%

Brazil

1,572,839

2.58%

China

4,327,448

7.10%

India

1,206,684

1.98%

511,765

0.84%

Indonesia

Legend

% of world
GDP

Mexico

1,088,128

1.79%

Saudi Arabia

469,426

0.77%

South Africa

276,764

0.45%

South Korea

929,124

1.53%

Turkey

729,983

1.20%

Subtotal

12,450,389

20.44%

G20 total

46,512,592

76.35%

EU (27)1

18,387,785

30.18%

G20 + non-G8
EU countries2

53,366,428

87.60%

1

EU 27: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
United Kingdom.

2

Non-G8 EU members: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland,
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden.
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*
2008 GDP
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database (Oct. 2009)
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of a Financial Stability Board (FSB).7 The FSB
was designed to bring about greater coordination
and coverage of regulatory systems to include
hedge funds, principles on pay and compensation,
controls on excessive bank leverage and bank
secrecy, and oversight of accounting standards and
credit rating agencies. Those calling for a “Bretton
Woods II” and a revamping of the institutions of
multilateral economic governance were met at
least halfway: there was eventual agreement on the
U.S. proposal to increase the IMF quota share of
the emerging market countries by five percentage
points, along with an increase in the voting power
of developing and transition countries at the World
Bank of at least three percent and a commitment
to reform the “mandates, scope and governance” of
7
The Financial Stability Board was established at the London
G20 Summit as a successor to the Financial Stability Forum,
which was created in 1999 by the G7 finance ministers and
central bankers as a forum to promote coordination and
information exchange among those responsible for financial
stability. The FSF was made up of financial regulators from the
G7 countries, Australia, Hong Kong, Netherlands, Singapore,
and Switzerland, as well as international financial institutions,
international regulatory and supervisory groupings, committees
of central bank experts and the European Central Bank.
When the G20 leaders transformed the FSF into the FSB, they
expanded its membership to include 64 participants—all G20
countries, plus Hong Kong SAR, the Netherlands, Singapore,
Spain, Switzerland, the European Central Bank, and the
European Commission. They also significantly expanded
its mandate to include assessments of vulnerabilities in the
financial system, monitoring market developments, advising
on best practices in meeting regulatory standards and the
establishment of guidelines and support for supervisory
colleges. U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner described
the FSB as “a fourth pillar to the architecture of cooperation
established after the second world war” referring to the
IMF, the World Bank and the WTO, noting his expectation
that the FSB will set high global financial standards and
hold all FSB members accountable to those standards.

the financial institutions, while Europe’s desire to
keep the number of seats on the Executive Boards
of the IMF and the World Bank at 24 was met. The
WTO was included in the later G20 meetings, and
was given the task of monitoring G20 pledges not
to take any protectionist action and to complete the
Doha Round of trade negotiations.8
A pattern began to emerge from the G20 summits
whereby the heads of state would assign tasks to
the multilateral economic institutions related to
specific issues, with instructions to report back
to the next meeting of G20 leaders. While the
response to the initial Washington summit was not
impressive, with markets around the world falling
significantly after its conclusion, as the actions
by the multilateral institutions and governments
to carry out their assigned tasks started to take
shape, the reaction to the subsequent summits
was much more positive. Also of interest is the
emerging process by which disagreements among,
for example, major European players like Germany,
France, and the United Kingdom, or between
Europe and the United States, were brokered by
other G20 members, with India or China or Brazil
serving this role of referee and conciliator.
8
The WTO’s scarce resources and prescribed impartiality places
strong constraints on its ability to effectively name and shame
members for adopting protectionist measures. A number of
independent monitors, most prominently Global Trade Alert
(GTA), www.globaltradealert.org, have stepped in to analyze
protectionist measures using a much broader definition of what
constitutes a protectionist action. With regard to the G20 pledge
to “refrain from raising new barriers to investment or to trade
in goods and services,” GTA found that, “on average, a G20
member had broken the no-protectionism pledge every three
days” in the year following the Washington Leaders Summit.
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Table 3. G20 leaders summits: Pledges and commitments
G20 Leaders
Summits

Pledges/Commitments

Washington,
November 2008

• Adopted 5 principles for reform relating to transparency, accountability, and enhanced
regulation of financial markets, products, and participants, including credit rating agencies,
with an action plan for their implementation
• Pledged to coordinate regulatory reforms internationally
• Committed to reform Bretton Woods Institutions to reflect changed economic weights in the
world economy, but no specifics
• Pledged to use expansionary macroeconomic policies, both fiscal and monetary, to stimulate
aggregate demand and encourage economic growth
• Committed to refrain from protectionist trade policies and to “strive” to reach agreement on
the Doha Round of WTO talks.

London,
April 2009

• Reiterated commitments of 2008
• Creation of Financial Stability Board (FSB) as successor to Financial Stability Forum with all
G20 countries, FSF members, Spain and the European Commission as FSB members, set up
to establish and enforce high global standards for financial regulation and monitoring
• IMF: Pledge to increase funding for the IMF and MDBs by $ 1.1 trillion, including a tripling of
the IMF’s lending capacity by restocking the IMF with $500 billion and creating $250 billion of
new Special Drawing Rights.
• World Bank: support for increase in lending of at least $100 billion and implementation of
2008 reforms
• Commitment to conclude an “ambitious” Doha Round and to avoid protectionist measures

Pittsburgh,
September 2009

• Agreed on a “Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth” to coordinate
and monitor national economic policies to correct the current global imbalances and
prevent future such imbalances, with some peer review and some IMF oversight of this
macroeconomic policy coordination
• Specific plans to increase the representation of emerging-market countries at the IMF by
increasing their quota by five percentage points to 43% of the total and similar initiatives at
the World Bank
• Commitment to crack down on financial institution excesses, including raising capital
standards, implementing international compensation standards and adopting frameworks for
cross-border resolutions of failed institutions
• Commitment to conclude the Doha Round by the end of 2010

Participants

Washington: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France1, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy,
Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands2, Rep. of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain2,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States
Ex-officio participants: European Commission (President), World Bank (President), Secretary
General of the UN, IMF (Managing Director), Financial Stability Forum (Chairman)
London: All Washington participants plus Czech Republic3 and ex-officio participants: Chair of
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), Chair of Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), WTO (Director-General)
Pittsburgh: All participants from London with Sweden3 representing the EU Council rather than
the Czech Republic

1

Representing EU Council and themselves
Permitted extraordinary presence
3
Representing the EU Council
2

Source: G20 website, www.g20.org

14

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

4

The IMF, World Bank, and WTO:
From Crisis to Reform

With each successive wave of economic crisis to
hit the world—from the Asian meltdowns in 1997
to Russia’s ruble crisis in 1998 to the collapse of
Argentina in 1999 and 2000—there has been a
subsequent torrent of hand-wringing, post-mortem
analysis, and calls for reforms to the architecture
of global economic governance in order to speed
recovery and prevent such crises from reoccurring.
Equally compelling has been a wave of tragedies—
from the tsunami in the Indian Ocean to Hurricane
Katrina in 2005 to the enduring poverty throughout
much of Africa—that have tested the world’s
ability to respond, accompanied by calls for a
better approach to development contained in
many a bestselling book or prominent commission
report. On the trade front, the WTO took center
stage not long after its creation, when protestors
outnumbered delegates at its Ministerial meeting
in Seattle in 1999, setting a precedent for civil
disturbances at meetings of the WTO, IMF, and
World Bank ever since. Overall, the clamoring
for reform reached a crescendo with the Great
Recession of 2008-2009, which has prompted a
number of pledges from political leaders to learn
from the mistakes of the past and to reform the
global economic architecture to meet the challenges
of the 21st century.
The various calls for reform have pin-pointed
problems of relevance, effectiveness, and legitimacy.
Waning relevance in the case of the IMF has been
detected as a result of the ascendance of private
capital markets; at the World Bank, as a result
of the rise of China and other new economic
powers engaging in infrastructure development;
and at the WTO as a result of the proliferation of
regional trade agreements. Waning effectiveness at
the IMF is a claim directed at the Fund’s inability
to tackle global imbalances and its “mission
creep” into bailouts; at the World Bank it has been
identified in relation to the inability substantially

to improve poverty rates, particularly in Africa, or
adequately address environmental, human rights
or corruption concerns, along with a perceived
“mission creep;” and at the WTO it has arisen from
the inability to conclude the Doha Round despite
the nine years that have lapsed since talks began
in November 2001. Finally, waning legitimacy has
been diagnosed at both the IMF and the World
Bank as a result of the lack of voting power or
quota levels held by emerging and developing
countries and the perception that the institutions
are controlled by a handful of wealthy countries
that impose conditionality on others but not
themselves; at the WTO, it arises from a perceived
lack of transparency in its operations combined
with concerns that the consensus-only decision
making process may be getting in way of reaching
conclusions, and from a longstanding failure to
ensure that the benefits of free trade are more
evenly distributed.9

9
Much work on reform proposals had been done well before
the G20 Summits. See, for example, World Trade Organization
(2004), The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional
Challenges in the New Millennium: Report of the Consultation
Board to the Director-General Supachia Pantichpakdi
(the”Sutherland Report”); and the report of the IMF’s
Independent Evaluation Office, Governance of the IMF: An
Evaluation, 2008. In addition to the work of such commissions,
there have been countless books and articles written, many of
which are noted in the bibliography at the end of this article. Key
among them would be Losing the Global Development War, John
W. Heard, 2008; Reforming the IMF for the 21st Century, Edwin
M. Truman, 2006; Redesigning the World Trade Organization
for the 21st Century, Debra P. Steger (2010); Studies of IMF
Governance, Ruben Lamdany and Leonardo Diaz Martinez
(2009); The IMF and its Critics, (2004) and The World Bank:
Structure and Policies (2000) David Vines and Christopher
Gilbert; “Reforming the World Bank,” Jessica Einhorn,
Foreign Affairs, Jan./Feb. 2006, Vol. 85, Issue 1, and The IMF,
World Bank and Policy Reform, Alberto Paloni and Maurizio
Zanardi, Routledge Studies in Development Economics, 2006.
In addition, a number of groups have been formed devoted
to reform of these institutions, including The Bretton Woods
Project (www.brettonwoodsproject.org), New Rules for Global
Finance Coalition (www.new-rules.org) and The Fourth Pillar
(www.fourthpillar.org).

Saving Multilateralism
Renovating the house of global economic governance for the 21st century

15

The various calls
for reform have
focused on a
perceived lack
of relevance,
effectiveness, and
legitimacy at the
IMF, the World
Bank, and the
WTO.

It is in the face of these challenges that G20
leaders have called for reforms to the international
financial institutions. These reforms will primarily
focus on changes to their mandates, scope, and
governance to reflect the increasing complexity in
the world and changes in the economic weight of
the various players. In addition, the reforms will
also involve greater coordination and coherence
among the three economic institutions, along with
the newly created Financial Stability Board.

Implicit in various calls for reform is a
reaffirmation of support by the G20 leaders for
a multilateral approach to economic problems
and for increased reliance on the multilateral
economic institutions to help solve them. Such
increases will necessarily also involve finding a way
to “multilateralize” many of the existing regional
agreements that cut into the scope of the work
of these institutions. Equally implicit in the G20
leaders’ statements is support for the ongoing work
of these existing institutions of global economic
governance.

In the wake of the Second World War, it was America that largely built a system of
international institutions that carried us through the Cold War. Leaders like Harry
Truman and George Marshall knew that instead of constraining our power, these
institutions magnified it.
Today it’s become fashionable to disparage the United Nations, the World Bank, and
other international organizations. In fact, reform of these bodies is urgently needed
if they are to keep pace with the fast-moving threats we face. Such real reform will
not come, however, by dismissing the value of these institutions, or by bullying other
countries to ratify changes we have drafted in isolation. Real reform will come because
we convince others that they too have a stake in change—that such reforms will make
their world, and not just ours, more secure.
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Guardian of Global Finance:
The International Monetary Fund

Mission
The principal international institution involved
in financial stability and finance matters is the
International Monetary Fund. The Fund has
evolved considerably from its original role, which
focused on management of the par value system
of fixed exchange rates. When the United States
eliminated adherence to the gold standard and
the system of pegged exchange rates in 1971,
countries were left free to choose their exchange
rate regimes and the IMF’s charter was radically
amended, pushing it to focus heavily on member
countries with persistent balance-of-payment
problems and on responding to crises that threaten
the international monetary system as a whole. The
Fund’s scope was also fundamentally altered by
the emergence of newly independent nations in
Africa and elsewhere beginning in the late 1950s,
followed by another wave of new entrants after
the end of the Cold War, both of which required a
change in financing and policy advice to support
growth-oriented structural reforms and transitions
from centrally-planned to market economies.
The IMF currently carries out its mission
through a combination of financing (typically
done through stand-by arrangements or special
loans), surveillance of countries’ economic and
financial policies, technical assistance, and policy
endorsements.
Governance
Both the IMF and the World Bank have a Board
of Governors made up of a representative of
all 186 countries which meets twice a year.
The IMF’s Board of Governors is advised by
two ministerial committees, the International
Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC),
and the Development Committee. While some
specific powers reside with the Board, the real
management of the IMF is done by its Executive
Board of 24 members, five of whom are appointed

(the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and
the United Kingdom), three of whom are elected
by a single country (China, Russia, and Saudi
Arabia), and 16 of whom are elected to represent
a group of countries, along with the managing
director of the IMF, who serves as the chairman
of the Executive Board.10 Over and above the
appointees of Germany, France, and the United
Kingdom, the remaining members of the European
Union are all represented on the Executive Board
in one of seven different country groupings. Each
member of the Executive Board controls a share
of the total vote at the IMF, depending on the size
and level of participation of those countries in his
or her group. The United States has the largest
single voting share with 16.77 percent, followed
by Japan (6.02 percent), Germany (5.88 percent),
France (4.85 percent), and the United Kingdom
(4.85 percent). While many decisions at the
Executive Board are made on the basis of majority
rule, some key decisions require a super-majority
vote of 85 percent, which gives the United States,
with its 16.77 percent share, the ability to block
such decisions. If the three appointed European
representatives voted together, they too would
have more than 15 percent of the vote and would
have, like the United States, enough power to
“veto” any action that required a supermajority
vote of 85 percent. While the IMF’s quota shares
are automatically updated, these updates have
not resulted in a substantial shift in power away
from overrepresented Europe to underrepresented
emerging market economies.
With respect to recent governance reform efforts at
the Fund, Managing Director Dominique StraussKahn created a “four pillar” approach to reform,
calling for a report from the IMF’s Independent
Evaluation Office, from an internal Working Group
Including the managing director, there are currently 10
Europeans (40 percent of the total) serving on the IMF’s
Executive Board.

10
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Dissatisfaction
with Fund
governance well
pre-dates the
crisis, reflecting a
sense of declining
relevance (given
ascendant private
capital markets),
effectiveness
(demonstrated by
the Fund’s inability
to tackle global
imbalances),
and legitimacy
(with institutional
structures
described as
outmoded and
feudalistic).

on IMF Corporate Governance, from civil society
organizations, and lastly from the Committee on
IMF Governance Reform headed by South African
Finance Minister Trevor Manuel. As the Fund’s
internal report noted, “dissatisfaction with Fund
governance well pre-dates the crisis,” reflecting a
sense of waning relevance (given ascendant private
capital markets), effectiveness (demonstrated by the
Fund’s inability to tackle global imbalances), and
legitimacy (with institutional structures described
as “outmoded and feudalistic”).11
In attempting to address at least the concerns about
relevance and legitimacy, the Manuel Committee
was established in September 2008 and issued its
report on March 25, 2009, in advance of the spring
meeting of the IMF. The Committee’s report called
for:
• The creation of a high-level ministerial council
(IMF Council) to foster political engagement
in strategic and critical decisions;
• An acceleration of the quota and voice reform
begun in 2009 by shifting to a 70 to 75 percent
majority for decisions, which would have the
effect of removing the U.S. veto power while
giving low income countries the ability to band
together to veto activities they do not like;
• A broader mandate for surveillance to include
macroeconomic policies, prudential issues, and
financial spillovers;
• Clearer lines of responsibility and
accountability among various decision-making
entities in the Fund with more authority
for member-specific surveillance given
to management and greater strategic and
supervisory roles for the Executive Board; and
International Monetary Fund, “IMF Governance—Summary
of Issues and Reform Options”, Strategy Policy, and Review
Department and the Legal Department, Jul. 1, 2009.
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• The introduction of an open, transparent, and
independent-of-nationality selection process
for the Managing Director, thereby eliminating
the unwritten rule that the Managing Director
must be a European.
For its part, the Independent Evaluation Office
report, Governance of the IMF, recommended:
• Clarification and alteration of the roles and
responsibilities within the IMF governance
structure to minimize overlaps and close gaps;
• Active and systematic ministerial-level
involvement in setting strategic goals and
overseeing performance;
• Reorientation of the Board away from
executive functions to a supervisory role
focused on formulating strategy, monitoring
policy implementation, and exercising
executive oversight; and
• Establishment of a framework to hold
management accountable for its performance.
Civil society organizations, for their part,
emphasized through their “fourth pillar” process a
greater need for transparency and communication,
particularly with the executive directors, along with
strong calls for changes to the distribution of voting
power and quotas and increased accountability
for the executive board. They also insisted that
the selection of the managing director and the
deputies should be conducted via a merit-based,
transparent process without any restrictions as to
the nationality of the candidates.
Mandate
With respect to the mandate of the IMF, the
current economic crisis has pointed to the need for
a number of substantial changes to the mandate
of the IMF. These include the establishment of a

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

sound early warning system for macroeconomic
and financial risks, broader surveillance of all
members’ macroeconomic policies (including the
United States and European Union member states),
tougher oversight of exchange rate imbalances,

and broad-based support for growth in developing
countries by helping finance counter-cyclical
spending, bank recapitalization, infrastructure,
trade finance, balance of payments support, debt
rollover, and social support.
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6
Europe has
long favored
a World Bank
focused almost
exclusively on
poverty alleviation,
while the U.S.
wants additional
emphasis placed
on private sector
engagement and
development.

From Reconstruction to Development:
The World Bank

Mission

Governance

Among the multilateral institutions, the task
of promoting global development and poverty
alleviation primarily falls to the World Bank. The
World Bank has evolved from its inception as
an institution with 44 member countries and a
focus on postwar reconstruction to a development
services organization with more than 10,000
employees and an administrative budget of $1.6
billion. Last year, its loan commitments totaled
$46.9 billion. Over the years, its core focus has
shifted from growth through trade and investment
in partnership with middle-income countries to
an organization set on alleviating poverty and
promoting development in poor countries.

The governance structure of the World Bank largely
mirrors the structure of the IMF, with a Board of
Governors that meets twice a year and the real
management of the Bank done by its Executive
Boards, which are also composed of 24 directors
who are appointed or elected by the same member
countries or groups of countries as the IMF along
with the president of the Bank, who serves as its
chairman.12 The voting weight of each country
is made up of both basic votes (whose value has
eroded over time) and votes that are dependent on
a country’s shareholding in the Bank. Unlike at the
IMF, which has automatic quota reviews every five
years, shareholding adjustments are made through
periodic—and generally very political—processes.
With 16.4 percent, the United States has by far
the largest voting weight at the Executive Board
of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, followed by Japan (7.87 percent),
Germany (4.49 percent), France (4.31 percent),
and the United Kingdom (4.31 percent). These
five countries have the right to appoint their own
representatives to all four Executive Boards. Three
other countries elect a single representative to
each of the Executive Boards (China, Russia and
Saudi Arabia), while the remaining 16 directors
are elected to represent a group of countries. As
with the IMF, all of the other members of the
European Union participate as part of a group of
countries represented by one of seven other elected
representatives on the Executive Board.

In the main, the United States and Europe have
had shared goals for and commitment to the work
of the World Bank Group. However, historically
there have been some differences in approach. At
its inception, the United States saw the Bank as
responsible for building a strong middle-class and
overall economic prosperity in middle-income
countries, in part to provide markets for U.S.
exports. As the Bank moved from reconstruction
to a focus on development, the United States
has typically favored a mission that continues to
place strong emphasis on the pursuit of economic
growth and productive investment that leans
heavily on the private sector. Europe was initially
on the receiving end of the Bank’s reconstruction
efforts, until much of that work was taken over
by the Marshall Plan. Once fully recovered,
Europe began to push for the Bank to work almost
exclusively with the poorest countries and the
poorest pockets of the middle-income countries,
and the Europeans remain strong proponents
of this primary focus on poverty alleviation.

Decisions at the Bank are made by simple majority
vote for ordinary decisions and by supermajority
(85 percent) for one type of decision—amendments
to the Article of Agreement. As at the IMF, because
Technically the World Bank Group has four boards (IBRD,
IDA, IFC, and MIGA) of executive directors with slightly
different voting percentages for each, but as a practical matter,
the same individual typically serves as the executive director on
all four.
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Table 4. The World Bank Group today
World Bank Group

Est.

Areas of specialization

Cumulative Lending/ Fiscal 2009 Lending/
commitments
commitments
(billions)
(billions)

International Bank
for Reconstruction
and Development

1944 Focuses on lending to public
sector entities in poor to
middle income countries.

$479
(effective FY 2005,
includes guarantees)

$32.9 for 126 new
operations in 42
countries

International
Development
Association

1960 IDA lends to world’s poorest
countries. Provides interestfree loans and grants to
public sector to boost growth
and reduce inequality. Major
source of financing for
infrastructure.

$207
(effective FY 2005,
includes guarantees)

$14 for 176 new
operations in 63
countries

International
Finance
Corporation

1956 Finances private sector
investment, mobilizing capital
in financial markets, and
providing advisory services
to businesses. IFC invests in
enterprises majority-owned
by the private sector. Aims
to address constraints to
private sector investment in
infrastructure, health, and
education.

$34.4 (plus $8 in
syndicated loans)

$10.5 committed
and $4 mobilized for
447 projects in 103
countries

Multilateral
Investment
Guarantee
Agency

1988 Promotes FDI into developing
countries by providing political
risk insurance (guarantees)
to the private sector. Insures
investment against losses
related to expropriation,
currency transfer restrictions,
civil disturbance/war, breach
of contract, non-honoring
of sovereign financial
obligations.

$1.4 in guarantees
$20.9
issued for 26 projects
(includes amounts
leveraged through
the Cooperative
Underwriting Program)

International
Centre for
Settlement of
Investment
Disputes

1966 Autonomous international
institution aims to provide
facilities for conciliation and
arbitration of international
investment disputes.

292 cases registered

24 cases registered
in 2009

The term “World Bank” typically refers only to the IBRD and IDA. The World Bank Group also encompasses the IFC, MIGA, and ICSID.
Source: World Bank Annual Report 2009.
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the United States controls more than 15 percent
of the vote, it alone has an effective “veto” power
to block any such changes to the Article, and a
mythology has ballooned around the perceived
reach of this veto power.

In October 2008,
World Bank
President Zoellick
established a highlevel commission
to focus on the
modernization of
World Bank Group
governance so
the World Bank
Group can operate
more dynamically,
effectively,
efficiently, and
legitimately in
a transformed
global political
economy.

Many proposals for governance reform at the World
Bank have been made over the years, primarily
aimed at addressing the various imbalances that
result from the appointed seats held by the “big
three” European countries, or from the U.S. “veto”
power. Most recently, in October 2008, World Bank
President Robert Zoellick established a high-level
commission, headed by former Mexican President
Ernesto Zedillo, to “focus on the modernization of
World Bank Group governance so the World Bank
Group can operate more dynamically, effectively,
efficiently, and legitimately in a transformed global
political economy.”
At the outset, the Commission on Modernization
of World Bank Group Governance noted
significant weaknesses in three key areas of the
Bank’s decision making and governance processes:
strategy formulation, voice and participation, and
accountability.
On strategy formulation, the Commission found
that the Bank lacks an effective means to formulate
a clear strategy that can be used to set priorities,
balance tradeoffs, and align operations and
resources with strategic goals. In part, this is due to
the advisory nature of the Development Committee
and the insufficient time available to—and seniority
among—the members of the Bank’s current
Executive Board.
On voice and participation, the Commission noted
that the decision-making process is widely seen
as too exclusive and that a number of conventions
and practices create the perception that the Bank
is accountable and responsive to at best only a
handful of shareholders. Contributing to this
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perception is the significant gap between the voting
shares of developing versus developed countries,
an allocation of voting power and special majority
rules that gives rise to the “U.S. veto” and the
considerable overrepresentation of European
countries on the Bank’s Executive Boards.
On accountability, the Commission cited in
particular the ambiguous relationship between the
Board and management, the conflict of interest
from the president of the Bank also serving
as the chairman of the Executive Boards, the
difficulty in holding the president accountable
for performance, and the non-transparent
process for the selection of the president, with its
unwritten convention that the president of the
Bank must be a U.S. citizen (just as the managing
director of the IMF must be a European).
The Zedillo Commission issued its report
in October 2009, which included five
recommendations that the Commission noted need
to be adopted and implemented as a single package:
• Enhancing voice and participation by
consolidating the board to 20 chairs from the
current 24, composing the board entirely of
elected chairs that represent multi-country
constituencies, and eliminating the link
between the IMF quotas and the World Bank
voting powers;
• Restructuring the World Bank’s governing bodies
by elevating the Board to ministerial level with
responsibility for overall strategy and direction,
major policy decisions, oversight and selection
of the President, delegating to management the
approval of financing operations and creating
an advisory council of representatives;
• Reforming the leadership selection process by
creating a rules-based, inclusive, competitive
process for selecting the President that does
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away with the current un-written rule that
reserves the Bank presidency to a U.S. citizen;
• Strengthening management accountability by
creating a performance review process for
the Bank president, increasing use of external
evaluations and increasing reviews of those
providing safety nets for the poorest; and
• Strengthen the Bank’s resource base through
increases to its capital base.
Mandate
With respect to the mandate of the World Bank,
significant change has already occurred. However,
as the many calls for reform indicate, much remains
to be done. With four branches in addition to the
original International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development and the establishment of regional
development banks, the World Bank has moved far
beyond its initial role of lending to public-sector
entities for reconstruction. Much of the World
Bank’s current support is provided through equity
investments, financial services, and political risk
insurance, in addition to traditional lending and
project financing.
In today’s world, it is clear that more needs to
be done to broaden and deepen the role of the
Bank, particularly in its relationships with nonstate actors, be they private business, NGOs, or
bilateral aid donors, as central components of its
development strategy and to ensure that it is not
trying to be all things to all people. Global leaders
and scholars alike have noted that the path to
economic recovery is one that will be primarily
paved by the private sector, be it small and large
businesses, entrepreneurs, microfinance lending
groups, or risk-takers and financiers from around
the world.

Private sector growth has been the engine that
allowed hundreds of millions of people to lift
themselves out of poverty in China and India in
recent decades. From Dambisa Moyo’s notion,
in Dead Aid, that development assistance to
governments is “easy money” that furthers poor
governance and adds to the poverty of Africa rather
than helping it, to R. Glenn Hubbard and William
Duggan’s call, in The Aid Trap, for a new Marshall
Plan of lending directly to private enterprises in
the world’s poorest nations, to the inclusion of a
global partnership for development with the private
sector as part of the Millennium Development
Goals, there are growing calls for more resources
to be directly granted to private and local business
in order to both cultivate a middle class and to
place market incentives and disciplines on more
economic activity. In addition, the Bank needs to
adjust its approach to address the considerable
competition it now faces in the development
of infrastructure from countries, particularly
China, who are willing to invest directly in largescale projects without many of the policy strings
(“conditionality”) normally attached by the Bank
to those activities. It also needs to ensure that
the Bank is playing as big a role as possible in the
effort to ensure that development and sustainable
economic activity go hand in hand. Moreover,
the G20 has conferred on the Bank a leading role
in responding to problems requiring “globally
coordinated action, such as climate change and
food security.”13
Pittsburgh Summit, Leaders’ Statement, September 24-25,
2009, paragraph 21.
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Negotiating the Rules: The World Trade
Organization

Mission
As with the IMF and the World Bank, the principal
governing institution of the global trading
system—first the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, then its successor, the World Trade
Organization—has undergone major changes since
it was first conceived in the 1940s. Following the
failure of the United States to ratify the Havana
Charter that would have created the International
Trade Organization, a smaller group of 23 countries
joined together in a looser arrangement to provide
reciprocal tariff reductions and to agree to certain
codes governing their trading relationships. The
GATT provided the forum in which eight rounds
of multilateral trade negotiations were completed,
substantially lowering tariffs on industrial goods
among industrial countries (although not yet
in agricultural products or the labor-intensive
manufactured goods of export interest to many
developing countries). Through its system of tariff
bindings, transparency, and adherence to rules—
especially the principle of nondiscrimination
expressed in the most favored nation (MFN) and
national treatment provisions—the GATT also
provided an underpinning of institutional stability
and predictability in international trade that served
as a guarantor against the threat of 1930s-style
protectionism throughout the second half of the
20th century.
With the increasing complexity of global commerce
came the recognition among GATT members of the
need for an organization that could provide more
comprehensive regulation of international trade.
The ITO as it was originally envisioned would have
held a wide remit beyond trade in goods, with the
ability to negotiate rules governing labor standards,
commodity agreements, restrictive business
practices, international investment, and trade
in services. With the conclusion of the Uruguay
Round negotiations, the GATT membership
agreed to the launch, in 1995, of a full-fledged
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international organization, the World Trade
Organization, which now has a membership of 153
countries. As with the original ITO, the WTO is
concerned with disciplines on trade beyond just
goods, and covers trade in agriculture and services
as well as rules on intellectual property, subsidies,
investment, and trade facilitation. The WTO also
boasts a binding dispute settlement mechanism.
Governance
Unlike the Bank and the Fund, the WTO does
not have a formal governance structure with a
governing or executive board. Instead, the WTO is
a member-driven institution, run by its members
with a relatively small secretariat that has very
limited power to propose, much less to impose,
solutions to problems. It is organized through a
series of councils—primarily the General Council,
the Dispute Settlement Body, and the Trade Policy
Review Body, along with the Council for Trade in
Goods, the Council for Trade in Services, and the
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights—which are chaired by a Geneva
representative of a WTO member country with
an annual rotation of the chairs. In addition, there
are numerous committees and working parties
on particular issues that are open to all members.
While the agreement establishing the WTO set
forth a number of procedures by which votes could
be taken on certain issues, in practice the WTO has
continued to operate on a consensus basis.
Cries for reform of the WTO began in earnest
following the huge protests and failure to
reach agreement at the WTO’s infamous 1999
Ministerial Conference in Seattle, Washington.
Four years later, shortly before another less-thansuccessful Ministerial Conference in Cancún,
the then-Director General of the WTO, Supachai
Panitchpakdi, established a consultative board to
address the future of the WTO and the institutional
challenges it faced. That group, led by former WTO
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Director General Peter Sutherland, issued its report
in December 2005, on the tenth anniversary of the
creation of WTO.
Among other things, the Sutherland Report
focused on the consensus-based decision-making
process. It recommended that more onus be placed
on any member blocking a measure that otherwise
enjoys strong consensus, and that the WTO reexamine the principle of plurilateral approaches
to negotiations and the possibility of approving
decisions by a critical mass of members. Also
recommended were regular annual ministerial
meetings, a WTO Summit of world leaders every
five years, and the establishment of a consultative
body for senior officials that would meet on a
quarterly basis. It urged the development of a set of
objectives for the WTO’s relations with civil society
and the public at large. The report also expressed
deep concerns about the spread of regional
preferential trade agreements and called for such
agreements to be subject to meaningful review and
effective disciplines at the WTO.
Two years later, Warwick University in the United
Kingdom established its first Warwick Commission
with a broad mandate to examine the governance
of the multilateral trading system in light of
growing challenges. The Commission looked at
ways to counter growing opposition to further
trade liberalization in industrialized countries and
to ensure that the end of the dual domination of
the trade regime by the United States and Europe
does not give way to long-term stalemate or
disengagement. It sought ways to forge a broadbased agreement about the WTO’s objectives and
functions and to ensure that the WTO’s many
agreements result in benefits for its weakest
members. Finally, as with the Sutherland Report,
it looked at ways to ensure that the proliferation
of regional preferential trade agreements
does not undermine the WTO principles
of nondiscrimination and transparency in

international commerce. Among other things, the
Warwick Commission recommended a critical mass
approach to decision-making and urged that the
industrialized countries refrain from negotiating
preferential agreements with each other as well as
the development of WTO disciplines and review
mechanisms for such agreements. At its most recent
Ministerial Conference in December 2009, in the
face of the continued inability to conclude the Doha
Development Round of trade talks, more than 20
countries endorsed a proposal to establish a process
to review the WTO’s “functioning, efficiency, and
transparency, and consider possible improvements”
in light of the “rapid change in the global economic
environment” and the need for the WTO to be
“agile and responsive.” To date, none of these calls
for reform have resulted in any changes in the
WTO’s governance structure.
Mandate
The WTO is still wrestling with the new mandate
it was given in the transition from the GATT
to an institution with a scope that was closer
to that of the original ITO. Already a chorus of
voices—including that of the European Union—is
calling for a still-further broadening of the WTO’s
mandate, with some attributing the failure to
conclude the Doha Round in part on its narrow
agenda of “yesterday’s issues”—namely, market
access in agriculture, in goods, and in services.14
Other WTO members like Brazil and South Africa
are more resistant, refusing to move on to new
issues until developed country members make
good on a promise that was made at the end of
See for example, Aaditya Mattoo and Arvind Subramanian,
“From Doha to the Next Bretton Woods, A New Multilateral
Trade Agenda,” Foreign Affairs, Jan./Feb. 2009, contending that
a new round of talks is needed to develop a more ambitious
agenda than Doha, involving a broader set of institutions than
just the WTO and focusing on a wider array of issues, including
food security (export bans on agriculture, biofuels policies, etc),
cartels, energy trade, exchange rates, regulation of sovereign
wealth funds, and climate change.
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the Uruguay Round—that, after a half-century
of resistance, liberalization would be extended to
trade in farm products and in light manufactures
of export interest to developing countries. This
long-running standoff is at the heart of the present
deadlock in the Doha Round.
However these issues find resolution, it is clear that
if the WTO is to remain relevant it will need to be
engaged in the trade issues, broadly defined, of the
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twenty-first century. These include competition
policy, investment policy, energy policy, food
security, global health services, technology,
environmental goods and services, and a host
of additional issues that are both contentious
and at the core of business concerns—including
corruption, corporate social responsibility,
exchange rates, immigration, and cyber security.
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8

Renovating the House of Global
Economic Governance for the
21st Century

A number of obvious commonalities and themes
stand out from these various calls for reform of the
Bretton Woods architecture:
• All recognize that the institutions of global
economic governance were created at a
very different time and under very different
circumstances but have failed to change,
particularly with respect to the changing
distribution of economic weight and power
among nations;
• All recognize that the imperative for change
must come from political leaders who are
above any particular institution in recognition
of the fact that it is virtually impossible to
change governance structures from within,
particularly when such changes involve shifting
power away from some to others;
• All call for increased and active involvement
at higher political levels in the governance of
the institutions, particularly in setting strategic
direction; and
• All support a broadening or deepening of the
range of activities and mandates of the existing
institutions.
It remains to be seen whether the sheer imperative
for a coordinated global response to the financial
crisis and the emergence of a broader and stronger
consensus among the G20 leaders will provide
the needed catalyst for change, or whether these
blueprints for reform will join a long line of well-

thought-out proposals issued with varying degrees
of fanfare only to sink without trace in the ocean of
well-meaning but failed ideas, swept away by many
of the same forces that make it harder to reach
international consensus on anything. However this
may be, in the meantime it is a source of hope that
the change that is most needed is not impossible to
achieve. For the multilateral economic institutions
do not need to be completely reconstructed
from the ground up. That would be unrealistic.
The current crisis is unlikely to be either deep
enough or of sufficient duration to create a “1944
moment”—a constitution-making moment
when major new institutions and institutional
relationships can be built anew or created out of
whole cloth. Instead, what is most needed is more
akin to a renovation and not a rebuilding.
This renovation of the house of global economic
governance would involve a rebalancing of power
within the existing institutions away from Europe
and the United States and toward the rest of
the world. It would involve a broadening of the
mandates of these institutions to enable them
to address the new issues of the day. It would
mean a deepening of the coordination among the
institutions, including the WTO, to ensure that
pressing issues do not fall between the cracks.
Finally, it would mean a new commitment on
the part of the major players to work to bring
the proliferation of regional agreements on the
sidelines into their folds.
How can this be done?
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Use of the G20
as a “Council of
Governors” would
give the emerging
market countries
a permanent and
significant voice in
global economic
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getting them
more engaged
in addressing
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multilateral level
and allowing
them to play
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when differences
between the
United States
and Europe
threaten to cause
global gridlock.

The Harbinger of Global Governance:
Political Leadership and the G20

The simplest way to achieve these goals is to
transform the G20 into a “Council of Governors”
for the three established international economic
institutions plus the new Financial Stability Board.
While the G20 may not be perfect—and debate
will doubtless continue as to whether the current
configuration is the optimal one—the fact is that
it has defied its doubters in reaching consensus
on specific approaches to a number of critical and
controversial issues. Both the United States and
Europe emerged from the three summits with a
good deal of confidence in the grouping. “When
we are talking about reform of the international
system…the G20 was seen as the right body for
these decisions to be made at,” noted British Prime
Minister Gordon Brown. U.S. President Barack
Obama noted that “the G20 will take the lead in
building a new approach to cooperation.” This
augurs well for the G20 becoming—as Nicolas
Sarkozy stated at the World Economic Forum this
January, “the harbinger of global governance in the
21st century.” The G20 Council of Governors would
establish strategic goals and then give the various
institutions the job of carrying them out.
This G20 “Council of Governors” would focus on
three main tasks:
• Setting the strategic direction of the
international institutions (IMF, World Bank,
WTO, and FSB) to ensure their mandates are
broad enough to cover the many issues that
are now falling between the cracks yet tailored
enough to ensure that inefficient overlaps or
mission creep are avoided;
• Pushing through the necessary changes
in the voting and power structures at
the IMF and World Bank to ensure that
those institutions’ governance structures
reflect changes in economic weight, while
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at the same time infusing the WTO with
direction and support from a smaller
group of higher level officials; and
• Holding the international institutions
accountable for implementing the directives
that come from the G20 summits and giving
the international institutions a forum to
hold the G20 leaders accountable for their
commitments to the institutions.
Providing the G20 with such a role would allow the
group to set strategic direction and then use the
considerable expertise and qualified personnel at
each of the institutions to carry out its instructions.
By giving the G20 the continuing role of coming
together at least once or twice a year to perform the
fiduciary duty of direction-setting and oversight
for these institutions, the G20 would be assured of
a consistent and on-going role in setting the course
of global economic activity. Use of the G20 for this
role would also give the emerging market countries
a permanent and significant voice in global
economic governance, getting them more engaged
in addressing problems at the multilateral level and
allowing them to play an important brokering role
when differences between the United States and
Europe threaten to cause global gridlock.
A G20 Council of Governors could also ensure
that any country putting up roadblocks to the
implementation of agreed-upon changes can
be singled out and pressured in the “court of
international opinion” to permit necessary changes
to move ahead. This increased accountability would
move in both directions, with the institutions
themselves having access to a high-level political
body to which to take concerns about failures to
follow through with prior commitments. Playing
this strategic leadership role would also allow the
G20 to fill an oft-cited need for high-level political
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engagement in the international institutions, albeit
at an even higher level than initially envisaged by
the reformers. Finally, inclusion of the World Trade
Organization within the ambit of responsibility
of this “Council of Governors” would ensure
that the WTO takes its rightful place among the
international institutions, in recognition of the
critical link between finance, development, and

trade, and the imperative of using the expertise and
rules of the WTO to ensure that private enterprise
can be fully engaged in worldwide economic
recovery and future prosperity. In addition to this
new role for the G20, it will also be necessary to
reaffirm support for the multilateral institutions
at the highest political levels, and to address the
explosion of regional agreements.
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Reaffirming Multilateralism in a
World of Regionalism

On the one hand, the international organizations
have been taken somewhat for granted as a
widely-accepted commonplace on the global
scene. On the other hand, they have become the
source of virulent protests and stinging political
rebukes from many quarters. Those on the right,
particularly in the United States, deeply resent the
United Nations and see it as a sinister instrument
of foreign domination. On the other side of the
ideological spectrum, those on the left frequently
get out the placards and line the protest routes for
most meetings of the WTO or IMF and World
Bank, objecting to what they see as the role of
these institutions in exacerbating the worst of
globalization—growing inequality that funnels
wealth to the multinational corporations while
leaving the poorest countries ever farther behind.
Particularly at this time of crisis, it is essential that
those who understand and appreciate the critical
work of these institutions stand up for them and
for the broad multilateralism that they represent.
Failure to do so will only undermine trust in the
institutions and in the belief that global economic
problems can and should be addressed globally. If
nothing else, the international institutions bring
both economies of scale and deep expertise that
cannot be readily replaced. As the world and its
problems grow more complex, this knowledge—
accumulated in many countries and over a long
period of time—can only be put to good use if the
institutions themselves are properly maintained.
The institutions also have greater staying power and
a longer-term, broader-based approach to resolving
global economic problems than any bilateral
or regional arrangement does. They have been
bringing together people and ideas from around the
world for more than 60 years in countless forums,
meetings, project planning sessions, and more.
Away from all the teargas and the ideological
smokescreens, it is in the mundane day-to-day
meetings, reports, and projects being conducted
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within these institutions that multilateralism is
most often advanced. Countries get in the habit
of working together and come to important
understandings about both the substance and the
procedures for their collective action. A steady
stream of information is exchanged, understandings
reached, and norms established through these
institutional gatherings. For example, despite
the inability of the WTO to reach consensus on
completion of the Doha Round, much agreement
and common understanding has been achieved
through the ongoing work of the various WTO
committees, particularly the Council for Trade
in Services and the Committee on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures.15 While these practices
don’t rise to the level of formal rulemaking, they do
form much of the bread-and-butter of multilateral
activity that is critical if countries are going to a
come together in times of crisis.
The statements of G20 leaders and others
supporting these multilateral institutions and
their work in particular—and the principles of
multilateral cooperation in general—are to be
commended, and will need to be repeated over and
over as the institutions continue to grapple with the
often-contentious issues of the 21st century. At the
same time, a number of threats to multilateralism
must be acknowledged and addressed. Most
importantly among these is the rapid growth
of regionalism and regional alliances and trade
arrangements.
For example, the WTO Committee on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures has adopted a decision on the
implementation of Article 4 of the SPS Agreement regarding
recognition of “equivalence” of different standards, procedures
to enhance transparency, and guidelines to further the
implementation of the SPS provisions on regional and pest-free
areas. See Andrew Lang and Joanne Scott, “The Hidden World
of WTO Governance,” The European Journal of International
Law, Vol. 20, Issue 3, 2009, pp. 575-614, citing WTO Doc S/C/
M18 and WTO Doc S/CSC/M/17.
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The debate over whether regional agreements—
and regional trade agreements in particular—
contribute to or detract from the multilateral
system has grown in intensity as the number
of new agreements, most recently in Asia, has
skyrocketed. Indeed, in the first 45 years of the
GATT—the period between 1948 and the creation
of the WTO at the conclusion of the Uruguay
Round—124 regional trade agreements were
notified, less than three a year. By contrast, the
last 15 years saw 333 new notifications of such
agreements, more than 22 a year. As of October
15, 2009, 457 regional trade agreements had been
notified to the WTO, 266 of which are currently
in force.16 The most recent is the Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)-China Free
Trade Area (ACFTA), launched on January 1, 2010.
This is the largest free-trade area in the world by
population (1.9 billion), with a combined GDP
of $6 trillion, making it the third largest (behind
the European Union and NAFTA) by economic
value. The ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free
Trade Agreement (AANZFTA) also went into effect
on January 1, covering 600 million people and a
combined GDP of $2.8 trillion.
Nor is trade the only area in which a spaghetti
bowl of regional alliances are coming into force.
The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilaterization
(CMIM), a regional financial mechanism in
Asia, encompassing the ASEANs, Japan, Korea,
and China, set up a $120 billion facility designed
to strengthen the region’s capacity to safeguard
against increased risks and challenges in the
global economy. The core objectives of this “Asian
Monetary Fund” are (i) to address balance-ofpayments and short-term liquidity difficulties
in the region, and (ii) to supplement the existing
international financial arrangements. As such, it
represents regional competition to the IMF, albeit
World Trade Organization, “Report of the Committee on
Regional Trade Agreements”, WT/Reg/20, 16 Oct. 2009.
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with a low enough total capital base for now that
the IMF will likely remain the lender of last resort
even within the CMIM region.
In the development arena, the World Bank has
seen an explosion in the use of trust funds, which
are bilateral or regional development funds
masquerading as multilateral ones. The World
Bank may administer them, but the funds must
be spent where and how the often sole donor
designates. Over a thousand such trust funds
have been established in recent years. Last year,
disbursements from such trust funds equaled half
of the World Bank’s total disbursements. Together
with bilateral development assistance, such trust
funds allow donors to impose their own goals
and strategy, which can bring in bilateral political
pressures or a short-term or narrow focus that may
not be in the best interests of a country as a whole.
China, for example, has put billions of dollars into
infrastructure projects in Africa while contributing
only $30 million to the International Development
Association (IDA), the World Bank arm designed
to help the poorest countries.
All in all, this turn to regional or bilateral
arrangements in lieu of multilateral ones is
huge, with approximately 50 percent of all trade
occurring under such agreements and about 65
percent of all aid currently coming from trust
funds, bilateral aid funds, or “vertical” loans or
grants focused on a particular issue. Why such a
dramatic shift? Many countries around the world
have turned away from multilateralism and the
multilateral institutions for a number of reasons.
First, there are non-institutional alternatives to the
multilateral system—ranging from a broad array
of private investment tools that supplant the IMF
to huge infrastructure projects that are financed
by foreign governments or other aid funds, often
undermining the role of the World Bank. Second,
many developing countries are skeptical about
institutions set up by the transatlantic powers in
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which they don’t have a significant voice or any
great confidence that the institutions will address
their needs. Third, they have found regional
agreements easier to reach, either because they
don’t require solving some of the hardest problems
on the table in multilateral negotiations—for
example, agricultural subsidy issues at the WTO—
or simply because reaching an agreement on a
bilateral or regional basis is easier than trying to
reach an agreement among the multitude of parties
to any agreement at the multilateral level.

particular products or don’t allow for cumulation
of inputs or resources from countries outside
of the particular agreement, which can lead to
inefficiencies and to hub-and-spoke systems of
trade in which power-based arrangements begin
to erode the protection of a rules-based nondiscriminatory multilateral trading system.17
Finally—and most importantly—proliferating
preferential agreements by their very existence
send a strong signal of a growing lack of faith in
multilateral institutions and the multilateral system.

The downsides of this rush to regionalism are
many. The time, energy, and resources required
to negotiate bilateral or regional agreements are
considerable, and by necessity take away valuable
time, resources, and political capital available to
countries to devote to multilateral agreements. At
the same time, bilateral or regional agreements
are much more subject to the vagaries of domestic
politics—indeed, they are often initiated in
response to particularistic commercial or foreign
policy pressures. Then, once they are in force,
most of these agreements have weak or nonexistent dispute settlement mechanisms, making
commitments under such agreements harder
to enforce. Bilateral and regional agreements
often have unique rules and provisions, which
increases overall transaction costs in the system
and makes it difficult for developing countries
to understand what they need to do to comply
with a wide array of differing sets of rules. On
the trade side, such agreements often exclude

As such, it is imperative that the multilateral
system work to fix problems that act as a deterrent
to deeper engagement by developing countries
while at the same time working to bring the
various bilateral and regional arrangements within
their systems. The multilateral institutions need
to recognize that the regional agreements are
massive in magnitude and scope and have added
enormous complexity to the system, but that at
the same time they are here to stay. Most urgently
needed from the multilateral institutions are clear
guidelines for any such agreements to ensure that
they are stepping stones to multilateralism rather
than barriers to entry for anyone outside any given
regional or bilateral arrangement.
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The potential for regional trade agreements to undermine
the multilateral system have been widely discussed. See for
example Jagdish Bhagwati, Termites in the Trading System: How
Preferential Agreements Undermine Free Trade, Council on
Foreign Relations (2008).
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Transatlantic Multilateralism
for the 21st Century

During the critical period of the Bretton Woods
conference of 1944 and in the months that
followed, a large part of the world picked itself up
from the ruins of depression and war and rallied
around the vision—largely set forth by the United
States and Great Britain—to create institutions
and accords that would prevent a repetition of
the disasters of the 1930s by allowing for global
economic cooperation and multilateral governance.
Then-U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
in his last address to the U.S. Congress, declared
that “the world will either move toward unity and
widely shared prosperity, or it will move apart,”
noting that the then-emerging plans for the Bretton
Woods institutions and the global trading system
represented the chance “to lay the economic basis
for the secure and peaceful world we all desire.”
The present global economic crisis has not been of
the same order of magnitude of the events of the
1930s. But it does represent another transformative
moment in world history. In particular, it presents
the United States and Europe with another
opportunity to exercise shared transatlantic
leadership to ensure that the vision of their past
leaders can be preserved, updated, and carried
forward into the 21st century with all the challenges
it brings. What do Europe and the United States
need to do to meet this challenge?
First, they need to commit to not give up on the
multilateral economic institutions, but to reform
them instead. Together, the United States and
Europe created these multilateral institutions and
they have as much to gain as ever in keeping them
at the core of the global economic architecture.
However, ensuring that these institutions remain
relevant, legitimate, and effective will mean some
significant changes in the manner in which both
the United States and Europe participate in their
operations. These changes are an opportunity to
show real leadership on the world stage at the cost
of some concessions in the formal power structure.

Agreeing to make these concessions would also
send a powerful signal to the rest of the world
that they can have faith that these institutions are
changing to accommodate shifting relationships
in the global economy and an equally powerful
affirmation by the transatlantic powers of their
continuing reliance on multilateral institutions.
For its part, the United States should give up on
both the unwritten rule that the head of the World
Bank must be an American and the insistence
that it retain veto power over matters requiring
a supermajority. In addition, the United States
should support the use of the G20 as a strategic
steering group or “Council of Governors” for the
World Bank, IMF, and WTO to ensure a strong
G20 role in strategy formulation and coordination
that would also give greater voice to the emerging
market economies.
In the same vein, the member states of the
European Union should give up on the unwritten
rule that the head of the IMF must be a European,
and work to consolidate European votes and seats
at the IMF and World Bank either into a single
European seat (which would give Europe the
single largest voting share) or at least consolidate
its seven partial seats with the bigger European
economies so that Europe ends up with no
more than four seats. As with the United States,
the European Union and its member states
should also lend their support to the G20 as the
“steering committee of the global economy.”
For Europe, the form of European participation
in the Bretton Woods institutions presents a
challenge and an opportunity to resolve the best
way to ensure the strongest collective European
voice in global economic governance. The coming
into force of the Lisbon Treaty gives the European
Union a formal international legal personality,
and all around the world the EU is reorganizing its
representation, a process that will continue with the
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In order to save
the institutions
they started, the
U.S. and Europe
need to give up
some of their
formal power in
order to allow
more legitimate
and more relevant
institutions to
emerge.

formation of the External Action Service. A reform
of the governance structure of the international
economic institutions would give Europe another
opportunity to put this new status into operation.

Today, at the WTO,
Europe speaks
with one voice,
through sole
representation
by the European
Commission.
The opposite is
the case at the
Bretton Woods
institutions.

Today, at the WTO, Europe speaks with one voice,
through sole representation by the European
Commission. The opposite is the case at the Bretton
Woods institutions, where the European Union
has no formal place and can only act through
the voice of certain member states. Nor does
the Eurozone have a formal place at the IMF. At
the G20, the European Union and the European
Commission have been present—but so, too, have
been individual member states (France, Germany,
Italy, and the United Kingdom, later joined by
Spain and the Netherlands), with some of these
member states overshadowing the European Union.
Reforming the manner of European participation
in the Bretton Woods institutions could be a winwin for Europe. It would allow Europe to show
leadership and a commitment to the modernization
of the multilateral institutions while at the same
time consolidating European power in a single
but larger voting share. But it will not be easy. The
three member states with permanent seats—France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom—will no doubt
resist giving up their exclusive rights. Many of the
issues related to financial regulation and reform are
still carried out at the national level, even within
Europe and within the Eurozone. However, the
opportunity to obtain more influence by acting
collectively in this one arena of international
economic institutional governance ought to be
compelling for Europe. These institutions do not
raise the same political problems of European
consolidation that would be present at the UN or
in other fora. Participating as one Europe could be
seen as furtherance of the process of a coordinated
European approach that was begun in preparation
for the G20 Leaders Summits and of the Lisbon
Treaty’s goal of making the European voice in the
world stronger.
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Nonetheless, on paper, all of this could be seen as a
dramatic loss of power on both sides of the Atlantic.
But as a practical matter, a diminution in sway over
the institutions of global economic governance
could result in longer-term gains that would stem
from stronger, more legitimate, and more effective
institutions that operate to the continuing benefit
of the United States and Europe and the kind of
stable, open, rules-based global economy they both
support. If the process and criteria for selecting
the heads of the IMF and World Bank were solely
merit-based, and if the United States and European
Union nominated highly-qualified candidates, they
would likely continue to take their turn in having
their nationals serve in leadership roles. Moreover,
while the exact voting share of countries is an
important symbol of their power, few if any formal
votes are taken in practice. In the process of finding
sufficient support for any given proposal short of
a formal vote, the consolidation of Europe into a
single voice may result in more, not less, influence.
Moreover, some diminution in the voting share
of the United States or Europe would still leave
both powers with the ability to block objectionable
changes simply by finding a small handful of other
countries to join them.
At the WTO, the concerns over and need for
transatlantic leadership are somewhat different,
while the challenges of effectiveness, legitimacy,
and relevance are the same. Unlike the IMF and the
World Bank, the WTO does not have an executive
board or a management board, nor does the WTO
Secretariat have the power to set priorities or
propose new rules or formal structures to approve
new rules other than through consensus—and
traditionally only through rounds of negotiations.
This means that the WTO does not need to engage
in any formal rebalancing—certainly not in the
direction of a further devolution or redistribution
of power. However, the WTO membership does
need to form new alliances and groups that would
create the basis for decision-making in the absence
of complete consensus. It is in putting together
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these alliances that the United States and the
European Union should play a leadership role
by taking seriously the recommendations of the
Sutherland Report, the Warwick Commission, and
other contributions to put in place alternatives to
the single undertaking—an “all-for-one and onefor-all” consensus only process. U.S. and European
leaders should ensure that a serious debate about
the WTO’s governance structure and its place in the
global economic architecture takes place now, while
leaders from around the world are focused on all
three pillars of the system and should make it clear
that this examination can be conducted without
detriment to the ongoing attempts to conclude the
Doha Round negotiations—and in fact could even
contribute to their successful conclusion. This is the
moment for the WTO to take its rightful place as an
equal partner with the IMF and the World Bank in
the global economic system.
Second, the United States and Europe should use
the G20 as the most efficient mechanism to insert
high-level involvement in the governance of these
institutions, particularly their strategic direction
setting and the coherence among them. They need
to ensure that the mandates of these institutions
are modernized to cover the many issues that are
currently going unaddressed—including food
security, energy policy, climate change, competition
policy, and corruption—while protecting against
duplication among them. They also must take
seriously the commitment to allow their own
macroeconomic policies to be subject to real
scrutiny by the G20 and the IMF for consistency
with the G20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable,
and Balanced Growth. Moreover, both the United
States and the EU need to take seriously the
proposals for reform of these institutions and to
stick with the reform process until the necessary
renovations of the institutions are completed.
Third, the United States and the European
Union should reaffirm their commitment to
multilateralism by working to multilateralize the

tangle of their own regional agreements and to
adopt a set of guidelines for any further agreements
that ensure that they do not detract from or
undermine the multilateral system.18 As in many
other areas, the European Union and the United
States have been at the forefront of regionalism. The
European Union itself is a regional agreement—
the largest economic free trade area in the world,
followed by the North American Free Trade
Agreement, linking the United States, Canada,
and Mexico. Given their leadership roles in both
multilateral and regional growth, the United
States and Europe should also lead the way in
finding a way to multilateralize these agreements,
particularly the agreements they each have in
common with other countries, in a manner which
brings them closer to multilateralism. Currently,
the United States and the EU remain each other’s
largest trading partners—far exceeding their trade
with any other country. For example, U.S. two-way
trade in goods with the EU totaled $988 billion in
2009, while its two-way trade with China was $366
billion. However, high on the list of significant
trading partners for both the US and the EU are
a number of countries with whom both have
negotiated a free trade agreement, most notably
Canada (the United States’ second largest partner
and Europe’s fifth), South Korea (the sixth largest
trading partner for both the United States and the
EU) and Mexico (the fourth largest partner for
the United States and tenth for the EU). If these
common agreements alone could be reshaped into
multilateral agreements, the United States and the
EU will have done much to bring a substantial
amount of trade back into the multilateral fold.

The concept of “multilaterlizing” regional agreements
has been much discussed in academic and other forums,
including at the September 10-12 2007, conference at the
WTO, “Multilateralizing Regionalism: Challenges for the
Global Trading System.” See in particular, Richard Baldwin’s
“Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowl as Building
Blocks on the Path to Global Free Trade,” The World Economy
29 (2006).
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The most important contribution to be made is
to agree upon principles to guide such efforts as
a way of distinguishing those agreements that are
acceptable within a multilateral system and those
that are not. “Acceptable” agreements would include
those that:
• Do not create conflicts with members’
obligations under multilateral agreements,
such as the WTO Agreement or the IMF’s
Articles of Agreement.
• Are at least as transparent as multilateral
agreements.
• Require full disclosure of all the details to
the multilateral institutions and subject the
regional agreement to potential assessment
by the relevant multilateral institution for

significant inconsistencies with multilateral
obligations.
With respect to trade agreements, much work
has already been done in many forums on the
specifics of harmonizing rules of origin, or
providing opportunities to cumulate inputs into the
manufacture of goods, resolving conflicts between
dispute settlement provisions, mutually recognizing
regulatory approvals and more.19 The European
Union and the United States need to agree to
undertake this work now in order to show others
that their own regional agreements can put them on
the path to greater multilateral integration.
See Richard Baldwin and Patrick Low, Multilateralizing
Regionalism. Antoni Estevadeordal and Kati Suominen
“Bridging Regional Trade Agreements in the Americas,” Special
Report on Integration and Trade, Inter-American Development
Bank.
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Figure 2. U.S. and EU Free Trade Agreements
U.S. Free Trade Agreements
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Chile
Israel
Jordan
Mexico
Morocco
India1
Canada2
Korea3
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South Africa
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Bosnia and Herzegovina
Palestinian Authority

Source: USTR

Source: EU Trade-European Commission (Jan. 11, 2010)

The United States has signed free trade agreements (FTAs) with
Colombia, Korea, and Panama, but Congress must enact legislation
to approve and implement each agreement in order for them to go
into effect.

1
Both the United States and the EU are in the process of
negotiating an agreement with India.
2
The United States and Canada have an FTA in effect. The EC and
Canada negotiated a common working document in Dec. 2009;
final confirmation of an FTA is pending further consultation.
3
While the U.S. has already signed a free trade agreement with
Korea, Congress has yet to enact legislation to approve it. The EC’s
FTA with Korea was initialed in Oct. 2009. The text of the FTA must
be translated into all EU languages before the ratification process
can proceed.
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Conclusion

The way forward—for the international community
as a whole, and for the transatlantic partners
in particular—is now clear. To cope with the
increasing complexity of world affairs, in which the
challenges themselves are growing more difficult
and reaching agreement among the large number of
players is ever more like a huge multidimensional
chess game, the institutions of global economic
governance are in urgent need of renovation. The
status quo is not an option—let alone the status quo
ante, before the economic crisis struck. Failure to
modernize the international economic institutions
in all likelihood will mean watching them atrophy
and decay. The end result would be even greater
fragmentation of global economic governance
into a patchwork of overlapping, competing, and
conflicting regional and bilateral arrangements
that would reduce the ability of both individual
countries and the international community as
a whole to act and to find solutions to the most
urgent problems of the day.
This need not be the case. In spite of Copenhagen,
in spite of the eight years of crisis and stalemate
in the Doha Round negotiations, in spite of
proliferating regionalism, it is still possible to save

multilateralism and to preserve the architecture
that has served the international community well.
Reforms can be made to our existing institutions
that both preserve the strong role and voice of
the United States and European Union while
simultaneously encouraging stronger participation
and commitment from the emerging market
countries. By acting responsibly and showing
leadership in the redistribution of power, giving
emerging market countries more say over the
strategic direction of the existing global economic
institutions, the United States and Europe can lead
the way in preserving and extending the benefits
of the multilateral economic order they created.
By working with the emerging market countries
through the mechanism of the G20 Leaders
Summit, they can provide a “Council of Governors”
for the global economic institutions. In this
manner, the United States and the European Union
can continue to provide the kind of stewardship
and direction of the global economy they showed
in the second half of the 20th century and that is so
sorely needed amid the increasing complexities and
growing challenges of the 21st.

Saving Multilateralism
Renovating the house of global economic governance for the 21st century

37

13

Bibliography

Bhagwati, Jagdish. Termites in the Trading System:
How Preferential Agreements Undermine Free Trade.
New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2008.

Eichengreen, Barry. “Five Ideas for Strengthening
the IMF,” March 2009. http://www.econ.berkeley.
edu/~eichengr/responses_global_five_ideas.pdf.

Baldwin, Richard and Patrick Low. Multilateralizing
Regionalism: Challenges for the Global Trading
System. New York: Cambridge University Press,
World Trade Organization, 2009.

Einhorn, Jessica. “Reforming the World Bank.”
Foreign Affairs Vol. 85, 1 (January/February 2006).

Baldwin, Richard E. “Multilateralizing Regionalism:
Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocks on the Path to
Global Free Trade.” The World Economy, 29, 2006.
Bergsten, C. Fred. Keynote Address. “A Blueprint
for Global Leadership in the Twenty-First Century.”
Peterson Institute for International Economics,
Global Human Resources Forum. Seoul, Korea.
November 4, 2009.
Blustein, Paul. Misadventures of the Most Favored
Nations. New York: Public Affairs, 2009.
Blustein, Paul. The Chastening: Inside the Crisis that
Rocked the Global Financial System and Humbled
the IMF. New York: Public Affairs, 2001.
Coffey, Peter and Robert J. Riley. Reform of the
International Institutions: The IMF, World Bank and
WTO. Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing,
2006.
Cooper, Richard N. and Edwin N. Truman. “The
IMF Quota Formula: Linchpin of Fund Reform.”
Policy Brief 07-1. Washington: Peterson Institute
for International Economics Policy, 2007.
De Rato, Rodrigo. “Is the IMF’s Mandate Still
Relevant?” Global Agenda. January 2005.
Eichengreen, Barry. “The G20 and the Crisis.”
Responses to the Global Crisis: charting a progressive
Path. Progressive Governance Conference
handbook, March 2009. http://www.econ.berkeley.
edu/~eichengr/reviews.html.

38

Estevadeordal, Antoni and Kati Suominen. Bridging
Regional Trade Agreements in the Americas.
Washington: Inter-American Development Bank,
2009.
Freeman, Richard B. America Works: Critical
Thoughts on the Exceptional U.S. Labor Market.
New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2007.
Gilbert, Christopher L. and David Vines. The
World Bank: Structure and Policies. New Haven:
Cambridge University Press, 2000.
“Governance of the IMF: An Evaluation.”
Independent Evaluation Office, International
Monetary Fund.
Gresser, Edward. “Geo-Politics.” Democracy
Journal, Fall 2009.
Haass, Richard N. “The Case for Messy
Multilateralism.” Financial Times. January 5, 2010.
Head, John W. Losing the Global Development War.
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008.
Henning, Randall C. “Regional Arrangements
and the IMF.” Conference on Reform of the IMF.
Institute for International Economics, September
23, 2005.
Horn, Henrick, Pero C. Mavroidis and Andre Sapir.
“Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of EU and US
Preferential Trade Agreements.” Bruegel Blueprint
Series; 7 (2009). http://www.bruegel.org/uploads/
tx_btbbreugel/bp_trade_jan09.pdf.

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Hubbard, R. Gleen and William Duggan. The
Aid Trap. Columbia Business School. New York:
Columbia University Press, 2009.
Hufbauer, Gary and Kati Suominen. Globalization
at Risk: Challenges to Finance and Trade. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2010.
“IMF Governance—Summary of Issues and Reform
Options.” Strategy, Policy, and Review Department
and the Legal Department, July 2009.
Johnson, Simon, Peterson Institute for International
Economics. Testimony before the Subcommittee on
Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, Committee
on Foreign Affairs. “US Foreign Economic Policy
in the Global Crisis.” U.S. House of Representatives,
March 12, 2009.
Lamdany, Ruben and Leonardo Martinez-Diaz.
Studies of IMF Governance: A Compendium. The
Independent Evaluation Office of the International
Monetary Fund, 2009.

Martinez-Diaz, Leonardo. “Toward A Grand
Bargain on World Bank Reform.” Washington:
Brookings Institution, December 16, 2009. http://
www.brookings.edu/articles/2009/1216_world_
bank_martinez_diaz.aspx.
Moyo, Dambisa and Nial Ferguson. Dead Aid: Why
Aid is not Working and How there is a Better Way
for Africa. New York: Farra, Straus and Giroux,
2009.
Nelson, Rebecca. “The G20 and International
Economic Cooperation: Background and
Implications for Congress.” Congressional Research
Service 7-5700, December 9, 2009.
Paloni, Alberto and Maurizio Zanardi. The
IMF, World Bank and Policy Reform. New York:
Routledge, 2006.
Patrick, Stewart. “Prix Fixe and à la Carte: Avoiding
False Multilateral Choices.” The Washington
Quarterly, October 2009.

Lang, Andrew and Joanne Scott. “The Hidden
World of WTO Governance.” The European
Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, Issue 3, 2009,
pp. 575-614.

Repowering the World Bank for the 21st Century:
the “Zedillo Commission Report.” High-Level
Commission on Modernization of World Bank
Group Governance, October 2009.

Lombardi, Domenico. “Report on the Civil Society
(Fourth Pillar) Consultations with the International
Monetary Fund on Reform of IMF Governance.”
New Rules for Global Finance Coalition.

“Status of Projects in Execution – FY09 SOPE,”
Operations Policy and Country Services, World
Bank, October, 2009

Mattoo, Aaditya and Arvind Subramaniam.
“From Doha to the Next Bretton Woods: A New
Multilateral Trade Agenda.” Foreign Affairs Vol. 88,
January/February 2009.
Manuel, Trevor. Committee on IMF Governance
Reform Final Report. Committee on IMF
Governance Reform, March 24, 2009. http://www.
imf.org/external/np/omd/2009/govref/032409.pdf.

Steger, Debra P. Redesigning the World Trade
Organization for the Twenty-first Century. Centre
for International Governance and Innovation
(CIGI) and Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2010.
Truman, Edwin M. Reforming the IMF for the
21st Century. Special Report No. 19. Institute for
International Economics, April 19, 2006.

Saving Multilateralism
Renovating the house of global economic governance for the 21st century

39

The Future of the WTO: Addressing institutional
challenges in the new millennium. The Sutherland
Report. Consultative Board to the Director-General
Supachai Panitchpakdi. World Trade Organization,
2004.
“The World Bank Annual Report 2009.” The World
Bank, 2009.
Vines, David and Christopher L. Gilbert. The IMF
and its Critics. New Haven: Cambridge University
Press, 2004.

40

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Offices
Washington • Berlin • Bratislava • Paris
Brussels • Belgrade • Ankara • Bucharest

www.gmfus.org

